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ABSTRACT
Lawyers traditionally have conducted research on
potential jurors outside the courtroom as part of voir dire.
But as wireless Internet access becomes ubiquitous,
attorneys are increasingly likely to conduct juror research
inside the courtroom, including during voir dire itself. In
the August 2010 decision Carino v. Muenzen, a New Jersey
appeals court held that a trial court judge erred when he
told a lawyer to close his laptop during voir dire, reasoning
that there was no disruption, no resulting prejudice, and no
rule against researching jurors online during the
proceeding. This Article examines the Carino decision and
the issue of researching potential jurors during voir dire.
Because there is very little guiding law, lawyers should
expect to encounter attorneys who research potential jurors
in the courtroom and realize that this practice may be
allowed at the discretion of individual judges.
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INTRODUCTION
Advances in technology have changed the judicial process and
forced new issues into the legal consciousness. Increased
availability to jurors of research and communication tools via the
Internet, for example, has generated new problems regarding the
proper juror use of those resources during trials. 1 Courts now face
a related but distinct issue: increased attorney use of the same
tools. The availability of Internet access in courtrooms allows
lawyers to research jurors in real time, inside the courtroom, and in
the presence of the judge and the juror being researched.
In the unpublished decision Carino v. Muenzen, a suit alleging
medical malpractice in the treatment of Joseph Carino’s deceased
wife, plaintiff’s counsel used his laptop to access the courtroom’s
free wireless Internet connection and research potential jurors
during voir dire. 2 Counsel for the defendant objected, and the trial
judge ruled that such use of the Internet was an unfair practice,
barring it. 3 On appeal, the court held that it was improper for the
judge to bar this activity. 4
1

See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?,
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011 at 4, 5 (describing juror’s factual and legal research,
as well as Blogging during trial).
2
Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *4 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010), cert. denied, 205 N.J. 100 (2011).
3
Id.
4
Id. at *10.
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This Article discusses the constitutional underpinnings of the
voir dire process, examines current voir dire research practices and
their public policy implications, and offers practice pointers for
judges and attorneys.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND GENERAL BACKGROUND
Rules governing jury selection have their roots in four separate
constitutional provisions. Article III 5 and the Sixth Amendment 6
provide for the right to trial by “an impartial jury” in criminal
cases, while the right to trial by jury in civil cases stems from the
Seventh Amendment. 7 The Supreme Court has interpreted an
“impartial jury” to mean one that is selected from a “representative
cross section of the community.” 8 Selecting an impartial jury also
requires “identifying and eliminating biased and prejudicial
prospective jurors,”9 which is the basis for our current voir dire
system. While the Sixth Amendment’s protections have been
extended to apply to the states, 10 the Seventh Amendment’s have
not. 11 Yet many states “separately provide for jury trials in civil
actions in their constitutions or by statute.”12 The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment further safeguards the
process of jury selection, prohibiting certain discriminatory
selection procedures.13
5

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment right to a “trial by
jury” implies an impartial jury as well. See McDonough Power Equip. v.
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1983).
8
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
9
Karen Monsen, Privacy for Prospective Jurors at What Price?
Distinguishing Privacy Rights from Privacy Interests; Rethinking Procedures to
Protect Privacy in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 REV. LITIG. 285, 298 (2002).
10
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
11
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 220 (1916).
12
See NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES § 1:11
(2d ed. 2009). For examples of provisions in state constitutions, see MASS.
CONST. art. XV; NEV. CONST. art. I § 3; N.H. CONST. art. 20. For examples of
provisions in state statutes, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-239 (2010); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 38 (2009).
13
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
6
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Beyond this Constitutional framework, sparse law guides
lawyers in whether it is appropriate to use the Internet to research
potential jurors. Many attorneys have recognized the lack of rules
on this issue and stated a desire for guidance, 14 even describing
this area as the “Wild West.”15
Further complicating the issue is the fact that each judge in
state and federal court may set different rules, because judges are
typically accorded broad discretion in setting proper courtroom
behavior, including the examination of jurors. 16 Nearly “every
federal judge has his or her own procedure for the selection of
jurors.”17 In addition, “[g]iven the broad discretion afforded the
court on voir dire, the district court’s determination on issues
concerning the scope of voir dire will be overturned only for an
abuse of discretion.” 18
Use of the Internet to research potential jurors implicates
constitutional and other important issues, including whether it
violates potential jurors’ right to privacy, whether it leads to the
selection of more impartial juries, and to what extent it streamlines
the judicial process. Some commentators have noted that such a
development benefits the legal system because the information that
can be gathered quickly from online tools decreases attorney’s
reliance on broad stereotypes in exercising their peremptory
challenges. 19 Others point out, however, that information collected
(1986) (holding that a prosecutor may not use a peremptory challenge to exclude
jurors based solely on their race).
14
See, e.g., Mike Rosen, Voir Dire for the Vanguard, CALIFORNIA LAWYER
(Oct.
2010),
available
at
http://www.callawyer.com/
story.cfm?eid=911878&evid=1.
15
Brian Grow, Internet v. Courts: Googling for the Perfect Juror, REUTERS
(Feb. 17, 2011, 2:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/
us-courts-voirdire-idUSTRE71G4VW20110217.
16
See, e.g., Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 1987). See also KEVIN
F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 4:7 (6th
ed. 2011).
17
See JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, 9 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§47.10[3][a] (3d ed. 1997).
18
See id. at § 47.10[5] (internal citations omitted).
19
See, e.g., Jamila A. Johnson, Voir Dire: To Google or Not to Google,
GPSOLO LAW TRENDS & NEWS (American Bar Association, Chicago, Ill.), Fall
2008, http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/law_trends_
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online may not be accurate, and in some cases, may simply
represent an effort of the clever potential juror to escape jury
duty. 20
In the absence of consistent rules regulating use of the Internet
to research potential jurors, the growing consensus among courts,
practitioners and academics is that conducting such research is
acceptable. 21 It has been argued that Internet research is required to
satisfy the lawyer’s professional duty of competence and due
diligence, 22 and LexisNexis markets a tool for this specific
purpose.23 As an indication of the extent of juror research in
practice, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that in order “to
preserve the issue of a juror’s nondisclosure [during voir dire], a
party must use reasonable efforts” to examine the potential jurors’
prior litigation history using online tools. 24 The court stated:
[I]n light of advances in technology allowing
greater access to information that can inform a trial
court about the past litigation history of venire
members, it is appropriate to place a greater burden
on the parties to bring such matters to the court's

news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/litigation_johnson.html.
20
See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Googling Potential Jurors: The Legal and
Ethical Issues Arising from the Use of the Internet in Voir Dire, FINDLAW (May
30, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20100730.html.
21
See, e.g., Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010), cert. denied, 205 N.J. 100 (2011); WAYNE
R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(b) (5th ed. 2010) (“When the
identity of prospective jurors is known, the prosecution or the defense or both
may undertake a pretrial investigation of them. . . . Information about potential
jurors often is available on the [I]nternet for litigants to research.”).
22
See, e.g., Should Lawyers Monitor Jurors Online? NEW ORLEANS
CITYBUSINESS,
Dec.
23,
2010,
http://neworleanscitybusiness.com/
blog/2010/12/23/should-lawyers-monitor-jurors-online; But see De La Rosa v.
Zequeira, 659 So.2d 239, 242 (Fla. 1995) (citing De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 627
So.2d 531, 534 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1993) (Baskin, J., dissenting)) (holding that an
attorney may rely on the potential juror’s duty of honesty, and refusing to
impose a duty on attorneys to conduct independent fact-confirming research).
23
See SmartLinx, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/government/
solutions/research/smartlinx.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
24
Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 559 (Mo. 2010).
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attention at an earlier stage.25
Continued Internet research throughout trial has also been
endorsed as a method of removing a juror from a case 26 and as a
method of obtaining a new trial. 27
Publicly available Internet tools allow attorneys to collect a
great deal of potentially relevant information regarding potential
jurors. For example, an attorney could use a person’s LinkedIn
Profile to find out that they used to work for a competitor of a
party to the suit, or Google to discover that a person belongs to
certain political organizations. A lawyer could use Facebook to
find out a person’s religious views and Twitter to uncover racist
comments. All of this information can be advantageous in
exercising peremptory challenges, and help the parties obtain an
impartial jury.
While Internet research has gained general acceptance, there is
more debate surrounding its propriety when it is conducted in a
courtroom. One Texas county provides every District Attorney
with an iPad specifically for this purpose. 28 In other jurisdictions,
attorneys may conduct this research from their table or bring
paralegals to do it more discreetly. 29 Allowing this research is most
advantageous when attorneys do not have juror pool information
prior to voir dire. In-court online research allows increasingly
flexible research strategies and facilitates real-time fact checking
of juror responses.

25

Id. at 558-59.
See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 688 (7th Cir. 2007)
(jurors dismissed due to background information discovered during
deliberations).
27
See, e.g., State v. Dellinger, 696 S.E.2d 38, 44-45 (W. Va. 2010).
28
See, e.g., Laura B. Martinez, Cameron Co. DA will Check Facebook
Profiles for Jury Picks, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 17, 2011,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/tech/news/7384860.html.
29
See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Tech Check: Lawyer Uses Web to Sort
Through Jury Pool, ABA J., July 2010, at 28, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tech_check.
26
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II. NEW JERSEY COURT OF APPEALS FINDS DENYING INTERNET
ACCESS IMPROPER
The August 2010 New Jersey appellate court decision in
Carino v. Muenzen provides a new perspective on the issue of incourtroom Internet research. 30 Joseph Carino sued Christopher
Muenzen, alleging medical malpractice in Muenzen’s treatment of
Carino’s deceased wife. 31 During voir dire, plaintiff’s counsel used
his laptop to access the courtroom’s free wireless Internet
connection and research potential jurors.32 Defense counsel
objected, and the trial judge barred the practice, stating: “there was
no advance indication that you would be using [the
Internet]. . . . Therefore, you have an inherent advantage regarding
the jury selection process, which I don't particularly feel is
appropriate.”33
Among the issues on appeal after a jury verdict was the
question of whether the trial judge acted outside his authority when
he barred the use of the laptop to access the Internet.34 The
appellate court found that he did but upheld the outcome because
there was no resulting prejudice. 35 In so finding, the court
acknowledged that the rules of the court did not address the issue
and that lower court judges get wide discretion in running their
courtrooms. 36 The court cited no authority to support its position.
Instead, the court held that because there was no disruption, no
resulting prejudice (because both sides had notice), and no rule
against the use of the Internet, it was improper for the trial judge to
bar use of the Internet, stating:
That [plaintiff’s counsel] had the foresight to bring
his laptop computer to court, and defense counsel
did not, simply cannot serve as a basis for judicial
30

Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010), cert. denied, 205 N.J. 100 (2011).
31
Id. at *1.
32
Id. at *4.
33
Id.
34
Id. at *7.
35
Id. at *10.
36
Id. at *9-10.
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intervention in the name of “fairness” or
maintaining “a level playing field.” The “playing
field” was, in fact, already “level” because
[I]nternet access was open to both counsel, even if
only one of them chose to utilize it. 37
This case raises at least three important points relevant to the
issue of courtroom research during voir dire. First, the court
acknowledged that there are no established rules in this area.
Second, the court acknowledged that trial court judges are typically
accorded wide discretion in determining proper courtroom
procedure. Finally, the court imposed a limit on judicial discretion
whereby an action taken in the absence of disruption, prejudice or
rule against it cannot be barred by the trial judge. Carino v.
Muenzen was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, indicating that this rule will stand, at least in that
jurisdiction.
III. WHAT ARE THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS?
Attorneys routinely conduct research on potential jurors, often
using online tools. This practice is generally accepted because it
facilitates the selection of an impartial jury. The issue in Carino,
and on which the following discussion is based, is whether
allowing such online research to take place in the presence of
potential jurors during voir dire is good for the judicial system.
A. Potential Jurors: Privacy and Perceptions
Members of the jury pool have an interest in (though not a right
to) privacy, 38 especially where threats of retaliation or coercion are
present. 39 While allowing in-courtroom research likely increases
the amount of research conducted on a potential juror, especially
when attorneys do not have potential jurors’ names ahead of time,
37

Id. at *10.
Free-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 511-12 (1984). See
also Monsen, supra note 9, at 289.
39
See Anne M. Payne & Christine Cohoe, Jury Selection and Voir Dire in
Criminal Cases, 76 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE TRIALS 127 § 7 (2011).
38
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this practice does not increase invasions of jurors’ privacy
interests. First, the information collected through online tools is
usually not private at all, but publicly available on the Internet.
Second, prohibiting in-courtroom research would not prevent the
information from being collected, but merely relegate its collection
to the attorney’s office or the courtroom hallway. Third, the
invasion into a potential juror’s privacy represented by Internet
research pales in comparison with other research practices and can
be significantly less invasive than voir dire questioning itself. 40
Finally, it has been suggested that permitting in-courtroom Internet
research could actually increase juror privacy, because it allows
attorneys to gather sensitive information quietly, rather than
eliciting its revelation on the public record through questioning. 41
A related and perhaps more important question is whether this
conduct might affect potential jurors’ perceptions of their privacy
and potential invasions of it. People who have served in jury pools
have reported being offended by the extent of information they are
required to expose publicly, 42 which could lead to decreased
willingness to participate 43 or otherwise interfere with their ability
to perform their duties to the court.44 If jurors were aware of the
40

See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of
Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1690 (2008) (“Jury
consultants increasingly run background checks on the various prospective
jurors in the pool, pulling credit reports, employing search engines, looking for
rap sheets, and examining property tax records. In high-stakes cases, jury
consultants work with private investigators who photograph prospective jurors'
homes and vehicles, searching for any pertinent information like a political yard
sign or a religious bumper sticker.”).
41
Carol J. Williams, Jury Duty? May Want to Edit Online Profile, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/29/nation/na-jury29.
42
See, e.g., United States v. Padilla-Valenzuela, 896 F.Supp. 968, 971 (D.
Ariz. 1995) (“As the scope of inquiry during voir dire has relentlessly expanded,
resistance has been expressed by or on behalf of prospective jurors.”); Nancy J.
King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in
Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 126 (1996) (“Juror apprehension about
safety and privacy may be at an all-time high.”).
43
See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 40, at 1694 (“Jury duty is already viewed
as an unappetizing prospect for many Americans, and the loss of privacy
associated with comprehensive government background checks could prompt
stiff resistance and exacerbate juror absenteeism.”).
44
See United States v. Black, 483 F.Supp.2d 618, 630-31 (N.D. Ill. 2007)

102

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 7:2

extent of information being collected in addition to the information
they provide, this effect could be exacerbated. Jurors who notice
attorneys conducting online research may also be more likely to
conduct their own independent online research about the case, even
despite a judge’s instructions to the contrary. 45 In light of these
concerns, even commentators who advocate conducting incourtroom Internet research on potential jurors caution attorneys to
be careful to “avoid overt references to a juror’s personal
information during jury selection and trial,” and to be discreet
about conducting the research while in the presence of the jury. 46
Whether or not courts come to allow this research, some have
argued that potential jurors should at least be alerted that their
online presence may be subjected to scrutiny by attorneys. 47 Rather
than concealing this activity from those dutifully serving the
system, it is argued, courts should educate potential jurors on the
possible risks of service. It remains to be seen whether these
suggestions will be adopted by the courts.
B. Other Policy Concerns
Courts and society have an interest in building an efficient
legal system that keeps costs low,48 and the Sixth Amendment
provides criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. 49 Allowing
in-courtroom Internet research of potential jurors facilitates both of
these goals. The ability to conduct research and verify juror
responses in real time in a courtroom prevents attorneys from
having to return to their offices or take breaks in order to conduct
(“[T]o transform jurors' personal lives into public news . . . could unnecessarily
interfere with the jurors' ability or willingness to perform their sworn duties.”).
45
See generally Morrison, supra note 1, at 5.
46
Christopher B. Hopkins, Internet Social Networking Sites for Lawyers,
TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2009, at 12, 14. See also Julie Kay, Vetting Jurors via
MySpace: Social Websites Contain a Trove of Data for Attorneys, 809 PLI/LIT
87, 92 (2009).
47
See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 1, at 15.
48
See, e.g., David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy:
Constitutional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 33-34
(1997).
49
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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research and respond to its results. This speeds up the process and
facilitates more flexible approaches to voir dire.
While the relevant facts of Carino centered on the use of a
laptop computer to access a court-provided wireless Internet
connection, other tools could be used to accomplish the same
objective. Internet research could be conducted with a smartphone,
or a tablet or laptop computer tethered to a cell phone network.
Thus any rule promulgated by a court or legislature should address
the issue of in-courtroom research broadly, rather than access to a
wireless Internet network specifically. As an example, a court
could ban the use of all electronic devices, a rule already enforced
in some courts.50
Finally, in reaching its conclusion, the Carino court noted a
press release announcing that the courtroom at issue had wireless
Internet available. 51 The court reasoned that this press release
provided all attorneys with notice of the Internet’s availability,
indicating that there was no unfairness resulting from its use. 52
This sort of evidence may lead a court to find that there was no
prejudice in an attorney’s use of the Internet in future cases. In
general, however, attorneys should be on notice that Internet
research is possible even in the absence of a public wireless
Internet network through technologies such as smartphones.
CONCLUSION
Increased availability of the Internet in courtrooms has led
some attorneys to conduct juror research as voir dire takes place.
There are few guidelines as to whether this is an appropriate
practice, and in the first case to address the issue, a New Jersey
court held that a trial court judge’s decision to prevent it was
improper. Competing policy considerations make it unclear what
the best rule would be: allowing this research potentially increases
50

See, e.g., New Jersey Appellate Court: Lawyers Can Google Jurors,
GOING PAPERLESS (Oct. 13, 2010, 5:42 PM), http://goingpaperlessblog.com/
2010/10/13/new-jersey-appellate-court-lawyers-can-google-jurors.
51
Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010), cert. denied, 205 N.J. 100 (2011).
52
Id.
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judicial efficiency but also potentially decreases society’s
willingness to participate in the judicial system. Because individual
judges generally have broad discretion in running the voir dire
process, different rules may arise in different jurisdictions. Current
law suggests that, outside New Jersey, the decision remains with
individual judges.
PRACTICE POINTERS
For lawyers:


The propriety of in-courtroom juror research is a live issue
and a judge could rule either way if the question is
presented.



Potential jurors could react in unpredictable ways upon
realizing they are being researched.



Be prepared to object to opposing parties’ use of the
Internet, or to follow suit if opposing counsel engages in
such research (bring a laptop).



The Carino decision indicates that arguments to the court
against use of in-court Internet research should focus on
any evidence of courtroom disruption or resulting
prejudice.

For judges:


Be prepared for attorneys who conduct juror research in
your courtroom, and be prepared to hear objections to it.



Unless you are in New Jersey, whether you allow the
research is for now within your discretion.



The first court to hear the issue on appeal took the view that
this research should be allowed absent a showing of
courtroom disruption or resulting prejudice.

